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The KORUS FTA on Foreign Law Firms 
and Attorneys in South Korea—a 
Contemporary Analysis on Expansion 
into East Asia 
By Jeanne Lee John* 
Abstract: South Korea has historically restricted foreign entry into its domestic 
legal services market, but has finally opened up its market to the practicing 
attorneys of any country with which it has a free trade agreement.  U.S. firms 
and attorneys have been applying to open offices in Korea since March 2012, 
when the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement went into effect.  The global legal 
community has been forecasting the moves into Korea as well as the broader 
effect foreign entry will have on the Korean domestic legal services market.  
Many point to Germany as the gloomy example of a country whose certain legal 
markets were dominated by foreign presence.  Few recall Japan, where foreign 
and domestic firms adapt to and complement each other’s market strength, even 
though Korea has specifically modeled its own liberalization after Japan’s 
market opening over the last fifteen years.  This Comment provides an analysis 
of the buzz surrounding Korea’s legal services market liberalization, specifically 
addressing perceptions both for and against it.  By focusing on (1) the legal 
education system, (2) the history leading up to foreign entry and the period of 
time following foreign entry, as well as (3) the current state of the legal services 
market in Germany, Japan, and Korea, this Comment concludes with five 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Law firms are exploring the benefits of a geographically diverse 
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footprint by looking for growth opportunities abroad.
1
  In fact, the largest 
U.S.-based law firms have grown in their activities abroad at a rate of ten-
to-one over their growth within U.S. borders.
2
  In light of the financial 
turmoil shaking the globe since 2008, however, lawyers and law firms are 
warily testing “the promise of benefits from a diversified practice” that 
reaches the laws and people in jurisdictions around the world.
3
  As firms 
and attorneys in the Eastern and Western hemispheres of the globe 
contemplate setting up shop in South Korea (Korea)
4
, now an emerging 
option for expansion, this Comment spotlights the liberalization of the 
Korean legal services market. 
Foreign attorneys or law firms have never been allowed to work 
autonomously in Korea—until now.  Korea has entered into Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) with countries around the world to affirmatively allow 
foreign entry into its legal market for the first time in history.
5
  In October 
2011, both chambers of the U.S. Congress approved legislation to 
implement the FTA between Korea and the United States (KORUS FTA), 
which President Obama signed into law.
6
  Just one month later, the Korean 
National Assembly also passed the agreement.
7
  By March 15, 2012, the 
FTA had entered into force.
8
  U.S. firms and attorneys will now join those 
of other countries with whom Korea has FTAs in the pool of legal 
professionals eligible to finally enter the Korean legal services market. 
Proponents of the legal market liberalization in particular have always 
argued that the opening will lead to lower legal costs, and increase the 
overall quality of legal services in Korea because of increased competition.
9
  
A ministry official explained that the anticipation would galvanize the local 
 
 1  Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice, 43 INT’L LAW. 943, 943 (2009). 
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. 
 4  While “Korea” may accurately refer to either North Korea or South Korea, or even the 
two sovereign states combined, for purposes of this Comment, the term will be used as a less 
cumbersome reference to South Korea, officially the Republic of Korea. 
 5  Si-soo Park, Foreign Law Firms Can Open Consultant Offices Here, KOR. TIMES (Mar. 
3, 2009, 6:31 PM), 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/117_40616.html. 
 6  United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-41, 
125 Stat. 428 (2011). 
 7  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Statement by U.S. Trade Rep. Ron Kirk 
on Kor. Parliament’s Passage of U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november/statement-us-trade-
representative-ron-kirk-korean. 
 8  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S., Kor. Set Date for Entry Into Force 
of U.S.-Kor. Trade Agreement (Feb. 2012), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2012/february/united-states-korea-set-date-entry-force-us-korea. 
 9  See, e.g., Hyung Tae Kim, Comment, Legal Market Liberalization in South Korea: 
Preparations for Change, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 199, 212–15 (2006). 
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bar association, domestic firms, and Korean attorneys, and that the ultimate 
goal of the opening was not to create more jobs for foreigners but to 
upgrade the Korean legal services industry.
10
  Moreover, these proponents 
have predicted that foreign firms will not directly compete with Korean 
firms, but rather carve out their own niches in cross-border practices areas,
11
 
focusing on international transactions, capital markets, and foreign 
investment related matters.
12
  Finally, liberalization proponents suggest that 
the resulting presence of and collaboration with U.S. firms in particular will 
attract foreign direct investment activity to benefit all.
13
 
The reaction to the liberalization, however, has not been entirely 
positive, and it is perhaps the nerves of the domestic legal community that 
have made the wait more buzz-worthy.  The legal community and local bar 
of Korea have expressed concern that domestic firms in Korea are currently 
inadequate and too underdeveloped to compete with foreign firms.
14
  As 
early as 2007, attorneys in prominent positions at top law firms in Korea 
were making statements of what should or would be done with foreign 
entry into their markets.
15
  These attorneys warned that domestic law firms 
would either lose their elite employees to foreign firms or be forced to carry 
out a restructuring.
16
  They stated that these domestic firms had to build a 
more solid foundation through aggressive local mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A).
17
  The discourse regarding the future of the Korean legal services 
market has healthily raised a global awareness of the hopeful expectations 
as well as potential problems of the opening, but nonetheless has largely 
lacked a cohesive and methodical analysis, which this Comment 
consequently attempts to provide. 
After a review of the history leading up to the anticipated opening to 
foreign entry of legal professionals in Korea in Parts II and III, Part IV of 
 
 10  Park, supra note 5. 
 11  H. Park et al., South Korean Law Firms in Expansion Mode Following Legal Market 
Liberalization, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2011, 9:18 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9a4931de-c51e-11e0-ba51-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1izo2z6yd. 
 12  For an example of a firm’s Korea practice, see Korea, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & 
HAMILTON LLP, http://www.cgsh.com/korea/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (highlighting the 
firm’s extensive experience in transactional work, specifically with assisting clients on 
capital investment). 
 13  Choong-yong Ahn, Time for FDI Through KORUS FTA, KOR. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2011, 
4:19 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/bizfocus/2011/12/346_100547.html; 
Sang Hyuk Park & Gene Oh Kim, Foreign Investment in Korea, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 
75. 
 14  Kim, supra note 9, at 215–19. 
 15  See Domestic Law Firms Face Tough Competition, DONG-A ILBO (Apr. 13, 2007, 7:58 
AM), available at http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2007041342438. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
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this Comment analyzes the development of legal markets in Germany and 
Japan over the past thirty years: Germany as an commonly cited example of 
the success, perhaps domination, large foreign law firms have achieved in a 
country, and Japan as an example of a once highly protectionist East Asian 
country from which Korea has modeled its current liberalization.  By 
comparing and contrasting the past and current status of the legal profession 
and legal markets in Germany, Japan, and Korea, Part V concludes with 
five lessons which propose that Korea’s legal market will likely remain 
relatively unchanged.  Specifically, because of its sophisticated domestic 
legal market and use of dual-educated local attorneys, heightened awareness 
of international branding, and small pool of clients in need of foreign legal 
advice, Korea will make way for increased legal services specialization, 
maintain its elite local large law firms, continue to share its legal market 
with previously established Korea practices of foreign law firms, and see 
more U.S. than U.K. presence. 
II. THE BUZZ: WHO CARES ABOUT KOREA? 
The entry into Korea’s legal services market has been the cause of both 
hope and anxiety for at least six decades.
18
  The practice of law in Korea 
was restricted to Korean nationals for forty-seven years, until 1996, when 
the Korean Attorney-at-Law Act—which governs the practice of law and 
qualifications of attorneys—was revised for the first time to theoretically 
allow foreign legal participation in Korea.
19
  The actual acknowledged and 
official legal practice of foreigners in Korea never occurred, however, until 
recently.
20
  The talk surrounding the opening of Korea’s legal market has 
been seen on both sides of the world, and has not been confined to chatter 
 
 18  See generally Byeonhosabeob [Attorney-at-Law Act], Act No. 63, Nov. 7, 1949 (S. 
Kor.) (first version of the Attorney-At-Law Act, which has been amended numerous times 
since). 
 19  See id., amended by Act No. 5177, June 30, 1996, arts. 4, 6 (S. Kor.). 
 20  See discussion infra Part III.  As a note to the self-conscious reader, foreign attorneys 
are not freely permitted to practice in the United States.  Just as attorneys in the United 
States are regulated by the bar council of every state, oversight of foreign-educated law 
graduates and foreign-licensed lawyers is also controlled by each state of the Union, and 
varies across the country.  The different approaches and considerations regarding foreign 
attorneys include allowing for temporary practice, permitting lawyers to practice as foreign 
legal consultants, and allowing full admission.  See Carol A. Needham, Practicing Non-U.S. 
Law in the United States: Multijurisdictional Practice, Foreign Legal Consultants and Other 
Aspects of Cross-Border Legal Practice, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 605 (2007) (focusing on 
provisions in the United States that govern in-bound practice by lawyers licensed in other 
countries).  For more resources on the various issues surrounding U.S. transnational legal 
practice developments, see American Bar Association, Commission on Multijurisdictional 
Practice, AM. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/co
mmission_on_multijurisditional_practice.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
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in the legal community.  Rather, “Korea” has been the buzzword for media 
outlets,
21
 legal and business professionals, and government agencies in both 
the United States and Korea. 
Korea has grown to be among the world’s twenty largest economies 
since it was established only sixty-four years ago.
22
 Although its total 
population
23
 is about twice the size of the population of Texas,
24
 and it takes 
up a geographic space that is only slightly bigger than the state of Indiana,
25
 
Korea has transformed into one of the world’s leading economies and is 
now home to major business conglomerates, such as Samsung, LG, and 
Hyundai-Kia Motors, making it an attractive business market.
26
  
Geographically, it is well situated for business in Northern Asia between 
China and Japan—two of the world’s largest economies.
27
  Politically, 
Korean leaders have a large regional role in the East Asian area, and the 
Korean government is an integral consideration for U.S. foreign policy with 
regards to China and North Korea.
28
  According to the Obama 
administration, “ . . . South Korea has emerged as the United States’ closest 
ally in East Asia.”
29
 
Consequently, the KORUS FTA has received much public attention, 
mentioned in 2012 by President Obama in his first State of the Union 
address following the FTA’s ratification.
30
  With the earlier passing of an 
FTA between the European Union (EU) and Korea (KOREU FTA)
31
 in July 
 
 21  A Google search one month after the ratification by both countries resulted in 
numerous articles by The American Lawyer, The Asian Lawyer, JD Journal, the New York 
Times, and Bloomberg Businessweek, for example.  The same search done on the eve of the 
KORUS FTA’s entry into force in mid-March 2012 resulted in more articles in the 
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, the Orange County Register, 
and CNN Money. 
 22  The April 2012 estimate of the Korean population was 48,754,657.  Background Note: 
South Korea, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 12, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm. 
 23  Id. 
 24  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 § 1, 
at 21 (2011). 
 25  Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22. 
 26  MARK E. MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41481, U.S.-SOUTH KOREA 
RELATIONS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf; see also 
Emad Mekay, US Readies for Korean Business, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2007), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ID04Dg01.html (citing favorable and unfavorable 
business sentiments regarding the FTA around its signing in 2007). 
 27  Spotlight on Korea: Korea Q&A, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2010, at 84. 
 28  MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 7–8. 
 29  Id. at 1. 
 30  See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address: An America Built to Last 
(Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.c-
span.org/uploadedFiles/Content/The_Administration/State_of_the_Union/SOTU-2012.pdf. 
 31  An EU priority during FTA negotiations with Korea was to secure Korea’s 
  





 the U.S. government had been under pressure not to fall behind to 
the opportunities an FTA with Korea would allow for legal services and 
other markets alike.
33
  The KORUS FTA is the United States’ second 
largest FTA after the North American Free Trade Agreement, as well as 
Korea’s second largest FTA after the KOREU FTA.
34
  Economists have 
projected that the KORUS FTA will generate billions of dollars in increased 
trade and investment between the two countries, boosting economic growth 
and job creation for both.
35
 
Korea has also been particularly aggressive in the FTA push, having 
completed six other FTAs besides the KORUS FTA since 2002,
36
 and 
beginning negotiations on several others,
37
 including most recently with 
eyes on China.
38
  Soon after the KORUS FTA was signed, former 
 
commitment to allow EU law firms to increase their onsite presence in Korea.  The KOREU 
FTA, like the KORUS FTA, has given EU-based law firms and attorneys access to Korea’s 
legal market in a procedure similar to that given to the United States.  See generally 2011 
O.J. (L 127), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL:EN:PDF.  For 
example, the entry will be done in three similar stages.  Id. at Annex 7-A-4, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145171.pdf; see also discussion 
infra Part III.C.  For an in-depth analysis of the KOREU FTA and its implications for the 
United States, see WILLIAM H. COOPER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41534, THE EU-
SOUTH KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1–
24 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41534.pdf.  For an overview of the 
differences between KORUS FTA and KOREU FTA, see Yeongkwan Song, KORUS FTA 
vs. Korea-EU FTA: Why the Differences?, KOR. ECON. INST. ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES, May 
2011, available at http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/song_final_paper.pdf. 
 32  MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1. 
 33  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. Trade Rep. Ron Kirk Calls for 
Swift Passage of Trade Agreements (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-
office/press-releases/2011/october/us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-calls-swift-passa. 
 34  MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1. 
 35  Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22; but cf. Why We Oppose the KORUS 
FTA—KCTU Position Paper on KORUS FTA, KOR. CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS 
(Feb. 8, 2011, 9:47 AM), 
http://kctu.org/?mid=documents&listStyle=gallery&document_srl=9928 (arguing that the 
KORUS FTA will kill jobs, damage domestic industries, and lead to failure to meet labor 
standards).  For a U.S. report on negotiations leading up to the KORUS FTA, see The U.S.-
Korea Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Hearing on the U.S.-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement Negotiations Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 110th Cong. 26 (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg40312/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg40312.pdf. 
 36  COOPER ET AL., supra note 31, at 24 (Chile, Singapore, India, Peru, EU, and the 
ASEAN, which includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). 
 37  Id. (Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, Turkey, and the GCC, which 
includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman); 
MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. 
 38  See John Power, Should Korea Sign an FTA with China?, KOR. HERALD (Feb. 6, 2012, 
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“President Lee Myung-bak was elected in December 2007 on a platform 
that promised to boost [the country’s] economic growth rate through 
deregulation . . . increased [foreign direct investment] . . . and . . . FTAs 
with major markets.”
39
  Indeed, Korea’s regulatory environment is 
increasingly business friendly,
40
 having very few remaining barriers to 
foreign direct investment.
41
  Keeping the significance of Korea’s overall 
market and economy in mind, Part III turns to the history behind Korea’s 
legal system. 
III. THE WAIT: A HISTORY LESSON ON THE KOREAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
Some have called the restriction on foreign entry into the Korean legal 
services market “a draconian [one] unique among the major East Asian 
countries.”
42
  Indeed Korea is the last country of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
43
 to officially liberalize 
its legal services market.
44
  Korea has always prohibited foreign law firms 
“from opening offices in Korea, forming partnerships with Korean law 
firms, and recruiting Korean lawyers to provide . . . multijurisdictional 
services.”
45
  Foreign lawyers who have worked for Korean law firms have 
 
10:45 AM), http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120205000382. 
 39  Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22. 
 40  Kyung-Won Choi et al., Korea Recent Trends in Government Enforcement and 
Dispute Resolution, AM. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 90, 90. 
 41  Q&A Kim & Chang, AM. LAW., Oct. 2008, at 105, 105. 
 42  Id. at 127. 
 43  The OECD, established in 1961, is an international organization helping governments 
promote policies that “will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world.”  About the OECD, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2012).  Its member countries include all of the former G7 states.  Member Countries, 
OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
 44  The Impact of Legal Market Liberalization in Korea on U.S. Firms, KOR. SOC’Y, 
http://www.koreasociety.org/business/business/the_impact_of_legal_market_liberalization_i
n_korea_on_u.s._firms.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (providing an abstract for the April 8, 
2008 presentation by attorney David Cho of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, on the 
expected practical impacts of the KORUS FTA on his practice).  Admittedly, other countries 
that technically allow foreign access to their domestic legal services markets through foreign 
legal consultants have stringent requirements, reminiscent of Korea’s historical barriers 
discussed infra Part III.A, that still effectively exclude foreign attorneys and firms from 
practicing within their borders.  One surprising example is India.  See Arno L. Eisen, Legal 
Services in India: Is There an Obligation Under the GATS or Are There Policy Reasons for 
India to Open Its Legal Services Market to Foreign Legal Consultants?, 11 RICH. J. GLOBAL 
L. & BUS. 273 (2012). 
 45  Song, supra note 31, at 10. 
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also faced limitations in their ability to represent Korean and international 
clients in the country.
46
  To stay within the law, foreign attorneys have been 
operating their “Korea practices” out of their Hong Kong or Tokyo 
offices,
47
 which have been equipped to handle Korean-related legal work 
from outside Korea’s borders.
48
  For decades, these attorneys have traveled 
on three-hour flights, doing much of their business in Seoul hotel rooms.
49
  
Now, these same attorneys and law firms may continue their work 
involving Korean matters from offices located in Korea, and in the future, 
in joint ventures
50
 with Korean law firms while employing Korean 
attorneys.  The KORUS FTA, as the final necessary ingredient for the 
official opening of Korea’s legal market, has thus been long awaited and 
expected.
51
  It was never a question of if Korea would reach agreement with 
the United States, but when.
52
 
A.  Historical Protectionism and Anti-Competitive Practices 
Korea has traditionally applied restrictive business practices to protect 
its domestic services market at large, practices which have been regarded by 
other countries as trade barriers hampering flow of trade and fair 
competition.
53
  Valuing self-sufficiency and historically antipathetic to 
foreign influence, Korea earned the title of “Hermit Kingdom” in the 19th 
century.
54
  During Korea’s period of economic growth and development 
between the 1960s and 1990s, the Korean government had much more 
direct and positive involvement than the governments of other Asian 
countries; it made major decisions to manage the country’s economy, and 
 
 46  Quarterly Updates, CORP. COUNS. Q., Oct. 2009, at 681, 718–19. 
 47  Rachel Brash & Roger Parloff, A World of Lawyers: Asia, Australia, and the Pacific 
Rim, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 50, 63. 
 48  Misasha Suzuki, Note, The Protectionist Bar Against Foreign Lawyers in Japan, 
China, and Korea: Domestic Control in the Face of Internationalization, 16 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 385, 404 (2003). 
 49  Elizabeth Goldberg, Closed Society, AM. LAW., Oct. 2006, at 113, 113. 
 50  “Joint ventures” refer to the business association under the third stage of the KORUS 
FTA legal market liberalization, where foreign and Korean law firms will be able to employ 
Korean attorneys and establish voting shares or equity interests.  See Free Trade Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor. Annex II, 
June 30, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter KORUS FTA Annex II]; see also discussion 
infra Part III.C. 
 51  See Sean C. Hayes, The KORUS FTA Will Pass: Don’t Hold Your Breath, KOR. L. 
BLOG (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.thekoreanlawblog.com/2011/08/korus-fta-will-pass.html. 
 52  Goldberg, supra note 49 (citing Jeong-ho Roh, director of the Center for Korean Legal 
Studies at Columbia University). 
 53  Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practice as Trade Barriers Used By Korea and Japan: 
Focusing on Service and Investment Markets, 16 BOND L. REV. 117, 118 (2004). 
 54  See Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22. 
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this custom carried the day through the 21st century.
55
  Korea has had a 
history of restricting foreign participation in various industries, including 
advertising, film, engineering, construction, and the legal services market.
56
  
While many of these industries were liberalized after the 1990s, the Korean 
government still found reason to restrict domestic access to foreign 
attorneys.
57
  It cited reasons commonly given by countries around the 
world, including the “infant industry” theory—the fear that foreign lawyers 




Specifically, the Korean Attorney-at-Law Act
59
 has always protected 
the Korean legal market through extremely rigorous educational 
requirements.
60
  In 1996, while the Act was revised
61
 to theoretically allow 
foreigners to practice in Korea by abolishing a rule that restricted legal 
practice to Korean nationals, by even a decade later, no foreign attorney had 
been authorized by the Ministry of Justice to practice as a lawyer.
62
  
Impossible educational requirements included passing an exam offered only 
in Korean, which, for at least four decades, yielded annual pass rates 
ranging from less than 5% at best and around 0.25% at worst.
63
  Thereafter, 
 
 55  Lee, supra note 53, at 141.  Korea is well-known for its chaebols, large Korean 
business conglomerates that were historically family-owned and spurred on by aggressive 
governmental support and finance.  For a more comprehensive history of the formation of 
Korean chaebols and their significant contribution to Korea’s early economic growth, see 
MYONG HUN KANG, THE KOREAN BUSINESS CONGLOMERATE: CHAEBOL THEN AND NOW 
(1996); RICHARD M. STEERS ET AL., THE CHAEBOL: KOREA’S NEW INDUSTRIAL MIGHT 
(1989). 
 56  Lee, supra note 53, at 143–44. 
 57  Id. at 145–46 n.162. 
 58  Id.; see also Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Note, Liberalizing International 
Trade in Legal Services: A Proposal for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 941, 952–53(1995) (proposing four 
other reasons for host countries to restrict access to foreign attorneys, including: (1) lack of 
national loyalty and shared cultural values; (2) lack of necessary competence to practice 
domestic law; (3) inability to redress injury to citizens by foreign attorneys; and (4) lack of 
reciprocal access to foreign legal markets). 
 59  Byeonhosabeob [Attorney-at-Law Act], Act No. 63, Nov. 7, 1949 (S. Kor.). 
 60  See Kim, supra note 9, at 205–06. 
 61  Attorney-at-Law Act, amended by Act No. 5177, June 30, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
 62  Kim, supra note 9, at 205–06. 
 63  Jasper Kim, Socrates v. Confucius: An Analysis of South Korea’s Implementation of 
the American Law School Model, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 322, 337–38 (2009); see also 
Matthew J. Wilson, U.S. Legal Education Methods and Ideals: Application to the Japanese 
and Korean Systems, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 295, 336 (2010).  For a look into a 
particular individual’s attempt to pass the exam, see John M. Glionna, Seoul’s Intellectual 
Pressure Cooker, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21/world/la-fg-south-korea-exam-village-20110822 
(after giving up on passing the exam, Park Jin-hun still dreams about whether he could do it, 
thirteen years after first trying). 
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the Act limited licensing of attorneys to individuals who completed a two-
year training course offered solely through the Judicial Training and 
Research Institute (JTRI).
64
  Regulating entry in this manner through 
compliance requirements with technical qualifications, rather than expressly 
restricting entry, was an effective move
65
 made by countries faced with 
continuing domestic policy concerns for maintaining the quality of the 
profession
66




B.  Setting the Policy of the General Agreement on Trade in Services in 
Motion 
Various forms of trade agreements include bilateral investment 
treaties, which generally help protect private investment, agreements under 
the World Trade Organization (WTO),
68
 and FTAs, which can be between 
two or multiple states.
69
  An FTA generally reduces barriers to exports of 
products and services between trading parties to the FTA, such as by 
eliminating or reducing tariffs and quotas.
70
  While major global trade 
agreements have covered “goods” for more than sixty years, “services” 
have been covered by international agreements for less than twenty.
71
  As 
the share of services in international trade steadily increased, efforts to 
regulate that trade culminated in the adoption of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) in 1994.
72
  In 1995—the year before Korea 
 
 64  Kim, supra note 9, at 205–06. 
 65  Dai-kwon Choi, Korea. A Legal Profession in Transformation: The Korean 
Experience, in Reorganisation and Resistance: Legal Professions Confront a Changing 
World 171, 176 (William L.F. Felstiner, ed., 2005). 
 66  Lee, supra note 53, at 125. 
 67  See supra note 44. 
 68  The World Trade Organization deals with regulation of trade between participating 
countries, providing a forum or framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements.  
See What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
 69  Trade Agreements, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2012). 
 70  Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited Sept. 
4, 2012). 
 71  Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC: The Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal 
Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 878 (2010). 
 72  The GATS was a product of the WTO’s Uruguay Round on trade based on the view 
that technical and regulatory innovations enhanced the “tradability of services,” and it 
applies to all service sectors except those “supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority,” such as health and education, and air transport services.  For the full text of the 
GATS, see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1B, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 283, available at http://wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-
gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS Annex 1B]. 
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theoretically allowed foreign attorneys to practice within its borders through 
its amendment to the Attorney-at-Law Act
73
—Korea joined the WTO.
74
  
Under the newly minted GATS, Korea, as a member government, was 
committed to engage in negotiations with other WTO members to 
progressively liberalize trade not only in goods, but also in services.
75
  
Heightening awareness of services internationally,
76
 GATS inspired a new 
generation of regional trade agreements.
77
  These trade agreements address 
a broad range of services, including transportation, finance, legal, 





  Korea concluded its first FTA with Chile in 
2002,
80
 and almost twelve years after committing itself to negotiating trade 
regulations with other WTO countries, informally signed the KORUS FTA 
in 2007.
81
  With high hopes in the spirit of GATS policy, the KORUS FTA 
is projected to generate billions of dollars in increased trade and investment 




C.  The Foreign Legal Consultant Act and the KORUS FTA 
As a result of the Korean government’s efforts to satisfy its obligations 
under the KORUS FTA,
83
 and before the FTA’s formal ratification by both 
governments, Korea’s Ministry of Justice passed the Foreign Legal 
Consultant Act (FLCA) in March 2009.
84
  The FLCA is the statutory 
mechanism that specifies which foreign lawyers and firms may work in 
Korea.
85
  It also invalidates Article 109 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, which 
 
 73  Byeonhosabeob [Attorney-at-Law Act], Act No. 63, Nov. 7, 1949, amended by  Act 
No. 5177, June 30, 1996 (S. Kor.). 
 74  Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
 75  GATS Annex 1B, supra note 72, art. XIX. 
 76  Gary Hufbauer & Sherry Stephenson, Services Trade: Past Liberalization and Future 
Challenges, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 605, 612 (2007). 
 77  Id. at 618–21. 
 78  COOPER ET AL., supra note 31, at 16. 
 79  See Lee, supra note 53, at 143–44. 
 80  See Hae-kwan Chung, The Korea-Chile FTA: Significance and Implications, E. ASIAN 
REV., Spring 2003, at 71, 71. 
 81  See MANYIN ET AL., supra note 26, at 1. 
 82  See Background Note: South Korea, supra note 22. 
 83  See Kyungho Choi, Korean Foreign Legal Consultants Act: Legal Profession of 
American Lawyers in South Korea, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 100, 102 (2010). 
 84  Id. at 101. 
 85  For more information regarding the registration and requirements of foreign legal 
consultants and foreign legal offices, as well as sources on Korean regulations, see Foreign 
Legal Consultant (FLC), KOR. B. ASS’N, http://www.koreanbar.or.kr/eng/sub/sub04_01.asp 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
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prohibited foreign attorneys from an unauthorized practice of law.
86
  Article 
1 of the FLCA declares that the Act’s purpose is to establish prerequisites to 
qualify, register, and allow a foreign legal consultant (FLC) to work in 
Korea.
87
  In general, a registered FLC is a practicing attorney in good 
standing in an eligible foreign country.
88
  An eligible foreign country is one 
that has an existing FTA with Korea, ratified by both countries.
89
  Thus, 
despite the enactment of the FLCA in 2009, it was not until November 2011 
after the KORUS FTA was ratified by both the United States and Korea that 
U.S. lawyers and law firms could benefit from the provisions of either the 
KORUS FTA or FLCA.
90
 
Under the KORUS FTA, lawyers and law firms will enter the Korean 
legal services market in three stages.
91
  First, U.S. law firms may establish 
branch offices in Korea.
92
  U.S. attorneys may also provide legal advisory 
services on U.S. and public international law, but not domestic law.
93
  This 
first stage focuses on allowing foreign individuals to transact business in 
Korea.
94
  Second, in 2014, Korean and foreign law firms will be able to 
collaborate in matters where domestic and foreign legal issues are mixed, 
and share profits realized from such collaboration.
95
  This stage focuses on 
greater integration by foreign law firms.
96
  In the third stage, estimated to 
take place around 2017, foreign law firms will be able to enter into joint 
ventures with Korean law firms, as well as directly employ Korean legal 
professionals.
97
  This last stage envisions the fullest integration of foreign 
legal professionals in Korea, and the creation of international law firms.
98
 
The market will not be an open free-for-all for any FLC to establish a 
practice, however, and foreign attorneys will still be constrained in other 
ways.
99
  As a preliminary matter, the FLCA provides for certain 
 
 86  Choi, supra note 83, at 101. 
 87  Waegukbeobjamunsahbeob [Foreign Legal Consultant Act], Act No. 9524, Mar. 25, 
2009 (S. Kor.). 
 88  Id. art. 2. 
 89  Id. art. 6(1)1. 
 90  See Choi, supra note 83, at 102. 
 91  See KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45.  Note that this model is not unique 
to the United States, but is also used, for example, in the KOREU FTA, and while the 
discussion here uses “U.S.” attorneys and firms, the same schedule generally applies to 
attorneys and firms of other countries with whom Korea has an FTA.  See sources cited 
supra note 31 (liberalization with the EU). 
 92  KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Choi, supra note 83, at 103. 
 95  KORUS FTA Annex II, supra note 50, at 45. 
 96  Choi, supra note 83, at 103. 
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Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:237 (2012) 
250 
qualifications, including licensing and minimum practical experience 
requirements.
100
  Also, as the title “consultant” suggests, no foreign attorney 
may autonomously represent clients in Korean courtrooms or be self-
employed, but must work with some established firm, whether Korean or 
foreign.
101
  While these foreign attorneys may maintain their titles as known 
in their home jurisdictions, such as “attorney at law,” and also use the 
Korean word for “lawyer”—or byeonhosa—they must still always present 
themselves to the public as FLCs.
102
  These kinds of details indicate the 
research and deliberation that have gone into completing Korea’s agreement 
to finally open its legal services market.
103
 
IV.  A LOOK BACKWARD: THE LEGAL MARKETS OF GERMANY 
AND JAPAN 
To robustly forecast the effects of Korea’s legal services market 
liberalization, a look back to prior foreign entry into the legal markets of 
Germany and Japan is indispensable.  Although foreign firms have entered 
both German and Japanese legal services markets, the various legal players 
have also paved different paths in the two countries—differences that 
provide guideposts to the likely success of Korea’s future legal market. 
A.  Germany: Not Merely a Story of Large Foreign Law Firms
104
 
While a discussion of a country on another continent may seem 
inappropriate for an exposition on Korea at first glance, Germany has often 
 
Consultant Act, Opening the Country’s Legal Service Market to Law Firms in Foreign 
Countries that are Parties to Effective Free Trade Agreements with Korea, ANTITRUST L. 




 100 See infra notes 359–67 and accompanying text. 
 101 Park, supra note 5. 
 102 Waegukbeobjamunsahbeob [Foreign Legal Consultant Act], Act No. 9524, Mar. 25, 
2009, art. 27(1) (S. Kor.). 
 103 Foreign law firms in Japan, for example, were initially prohibited from using their 
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the value of a law firm” in any foreign jurisdiction.  John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The 
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STUD. 35, 66 (2007); see also infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text. 
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been cited in Korea and other East Asian countries
105
 as the gloomy 
example of foreign infiltration and domination in domestic legal services 
markets.
106
  Before the KORUS FTA was first signed, an article in The 
Korea Times
107
 analyzed this common reference, noting generally that 
“[d]oomsayers point to the case of Germany, which saw eight of its top ten 
law firms taken over by larger British competitors just more than a decade 
after opening its legal services market.”
108
  One scholar, upon studying 
large law firms in Germany, has suggested that developments in Germany 
may serve as an exemplar of what will happen in the legal markets of 
liberalizing countries, including Korea.
109
  To clarify the flawed 
comparisons between Korean and German legal markets and the 
unwarranted resulting fallacies in Part V, this subpart provides an overview 
of: (1) the legal education system in Germany, which is now distinct from 




 (2) the growth of German law firms 
coupled with foreign entry
112
 into the German legal services market; and (3) 
the German legal market’s current structure. 
1.  Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession 
The largest and most successful of large law firms in Germany are 
U.K.-based, but this fact paints a very one-sided picture of the German legal 
services market, which begins, as it does anywhere, with a legal education.  
German students begin their legal studies in university, directly out of high 
school.
113
  There is no admission test for students who intend to pursue law, 
and they can generally choose the law faculty they want to attend.
114
  
During the course of their university studies, students take several exams in 
 
 105 See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: 
Is Bigger Really Better? An International Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763, 821 
(2007) (discussing Japan). 
 106 See Goldberg, supra note 49. 
 107 The Korea Times is Korea’s first and oldest newspaper providing daily publications in 
English.  See generally KOR. TIMES, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/index.asp (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
 108 Tong-hyung Kim, “U.S. Invasion” Not Likely in Korean Law Market, KOR. TIMES 
(Apr. 15, 2007 10:42 PM), 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/05/206_837.html. 
 109 Christoph Luschin, Large Law Firms in Germany, 14 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 26, 29 
(2010). 
 110 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 111 See discussion infra Part V.A.1. 
 112 Because both the popular perception in Asia and reality of the German legal market 
reflect the success of large law firms from the U.K. and United States, this subpart focuses 
on the history of the legal profession from those two countries in Germany. 
 113 Stefan Korioth, Legal Education in Germany Today, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 85, 90 (2006). 
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various areas of the law, receiving certificates for passing each.
115
  These 
certificates are required for the next step, a state bar exam administered in 
two stages.
116
  The first exam covers the academic knowledge acquired 
during all of the previous years spent in university.
117
  Students are 
evaluated by a mix of professors and practitioners, and about 70% of testers 
pass.
118
  Between the first and second exam, students go through a 
compulsory two-year period of training through practical internships.
119
  
Thereafter, the second exam aims at testing the practical skills acquired in 
training, and is evaluated only by practitioners; about 85% of students make 
it past this second exam annually.
120
 
Germany has generally not faced concerns regarding an under-supply 
of legal professionals.
121
  The recruitment pool for large law firms and in-
house legal departments of very large corporations in Germany, however, is 
still quite small each year.  While the German legal education journey 
consumes at least six years, large employers ultimately look primarily at 
high performance on the two bar exams alone, as opposed to grades, law 
school rankings, or relevant experience.
122
  Moreover, with a historical 
commitment to producing jurists, a legal education has been regarded “as 
the best general education available in Germany,” and many lawyers do not 
pursue specific legal professions.
123
  Consequently, most law school 




2.  Merger Mania 
The recruitment pool for large law firms in Germany is also small 
because the market share of those firms within the domestic German legal 
 
 115 Id. at 94. 
 116 Id. 
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 118 Korioth, supra note 113, at 94. 
 119 Id. at 97. 
 120 GEROLD, supra note 117, at 10. 
 121 Mayumi Saegusa, Why the Japanese Law School System Was Established: Co-
Optation as a Defensive Tactic in the Face of Global Pressures, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
365, 366, 378 n.25 (2009). 
 122 E.g., Carole Silver, The Variable Value of U.S. Legal Education in the Global Legal 
Services Market, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 26–27 (quoting an LL.M. graduate working in 
a U.S.-based firm in Germany who explained that his placement in the top two percent of the 
German grade scale on the second state examination was the major reason for his job offers). 
 123 Rainer Grote, Comparative Law and Teaching Law Through the Case Method in the 
Civil Law Tradition—A German Perspective, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 170, 174 
(2005). 
 124 Silver, supra note 122. 
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services market remains small.  The growth of large law firms in Germany 
began in 1989, when domestic and foreign large law firms alike were first 
“allowed” in Germany.
125
  Historically, German law specifically limited 
German lawyers and law firms to practicing in only one German 
jurisdiction.
126
  Consequently, the traditional German legal market was 
exclusively in the hands of sophisticated solo practitioners, small 
partnerships, in-house counsel, or civil servants, but not in any large law 
firm.
127
  The biggest small partnerships had at most ten to twenty 
attorneys.
128
  In fact, German lawyers today refer only to Kanzlei, literally 
meaning chambers or office, and Großkanzlei, which are simply larger 
Kanzlei; German lawyers have yet to adopt into their jargon, however, a 
term that directly translates to “law firm.”
129
 
Beginning in 1989, with the overturning of the law prohibiting legal 
professionals from operating in more than one jurisdiction,
130
 the German 
legal market began to change rapidly.
131
  With the new ability to have a 
national presence, local offices began to grow.
132
  Simultaneously, the 
1990s saw the dot-com boom,
133
 the introduction of the Euro,
134
 and a 
unified European market under the birth of the EU.
135
  Nearby, law firms in 
 
 125 See Susanne Lace, Mergers, Mergers Everywhere: Constructing the Global Law Firm 
in Germany, in LEGAL PROFESSIONS: WORK, STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 51, 54–55 
(Jerry Van Hoy ed., 2001). 
 126 Martin Henssler & Laurel S. Terry, Lawyers Without Frontiers—A View From 
Germany, 19 DICK. J. INT’L L. 269, 274 (2001) (citing Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung [BRAO] 
[Federal Lawyers’ Act], Jan. 8, 1959, BGBL. I at 2515, as amended, § 59 (Ger.)). 
 127 See id. at 275. 
 128 Ulrike Schultz, Germany. Regulated Deregulations: The Case of the German Legal 
Profession, in REORGANISATION AND RESISTANCE: LEGAL PROFESSIONS CONFRONT A 
CHANGING WORLD 93, 120 (William L.F. Felstiner ed., 2005). 
 129 Luschin, supra note 109, at 30 n.4.  For the remainder of this Comment, however, I 
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the German context, unless clarity requires otherwise. 
 130 Henssler & Terry, supra note 126. 
 131 See Germany: Law Firms and Multinational Partnerships Easier Admission 
Procedures for Non-German Lawyers to the German Bar, MONDAQ § 4 (Jan. 20, 2000), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=8149. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Definition of dot-com bubble, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Dot+com+boom (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) 
(“Refers to the late 1990s during which countless Internet companies were riding an 
enormous wave of enthusiasm that pushed their stock valuations into the stratosphere even 
though they never made a penny.  Billions in venture capital were given to entrepreneurs 
with little or no experience to fund ideas that were ludicrous.  It was a crazy time, and people 
were very excited.”). 
 134 See generally History of the Euro, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/business/2001/euro_cash/history/default.stm 
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the U.K. had been expanding concurrently with the rapid development of 
financial and capital markets.
136
  With eyes looking to Germany as home to 
a new global financial hub, many U.K. firms established German offices, 
especially in the country’s growing financial center of Frankfurt am 
Main.
137
  The nascent national German firms quickly began to make plans 
to bulk up in competition with their foreign counterparts.
138
  That these 
domestic firms had to compete globally with the major U.K.-based 
international firms became a common perception,
139
 an outlook that 
survives and haunts members of Korean society today.
140
  Many national 
German firms, formed just recently, previously had no global ambitions or 
strategy but found themselves vying for a foreign counterpart with which 
they could merge into a large, international firm in order to compete on a 
global or at least a supra-regional basis.
141
  Both U.K. and German firms 
feared that, with the limited number of desirable partners on each side, they 
“might be left empty-handed in a game of musical chairs once the music 
stopped.”
142
  The ensuing merger mania—the herd mentality
143
 stemming 
from the fear on both sides of being left behind at a time of rapidly 
changing market conditions
144
—pushed German and foreign law firms to 
merge and form large partnerships. 
After the U.K. firms entered the German market through large-scale 
mergers, U.S. firms looking to be competitive in a globally expanding legal 
services market
145
 began to flock to Germany in the mid-1990s,
146
 but with 
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a different strategy.  Because the U.S. firms landed in Germany years into 
the merger game, most of the largest German law firms had through their 
mergers already committed to U.K. firms.
147
  Moreover, many remaining 
German firms resisted the merger wave and sought to be independent.
148
  
These resisting firms instead established their own international brand, 
formed informal alliances with foreign law firms, became focused 
boutiques, or concentrated on developing a regional presence—and they 
were successful.
149
  Consequently, U.S. firms tended to merge with smaller 
partners or set up small offices of their own.
150
  Many also strategized by 
simply recruiting key local attorneys.
151
 
At the same time, U.S. firms also had less incentive than their U.K. 
counterparts to establish large practices in Germany.  U.K. firms were much 
more likely to have a significant German practice, in line with a natural 
desire to dominate their regional Eurocentric market.
152
  U.K. firms also did 
not enjoy a similar substantial domestic legal market to that of the United 
States, and have historically been more internationally focused.
153
  
Freshfields Bruckhaus & Deringer (Freshfields), for example, the U.K. firm 
with the most foreign attorneys in Germany, employs its German practice 
with 25% of its overall global workforce.
154
  Similarly, the U.K.’s two 
largest grossing law firms by revenue have stationed one-tenth of their 
entire global workforce in Germany.
155
  Other Euro-friendly setups also 
made a German practice easier to attain for U.K.- than U.S.-trained 
attorneys.  EU-licensed attorneys, for example, can practice German law as 
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long as they re-qualify by taking an exam.
156
  U.S.-qualified attorneys, on 
the other hand, must either undertake a six-year German legal education
157
 
to enjoy the full benefits of bar admission, or skip such qualification and 
limit their practice to advising on U.S. or international law.
158
  The latter 
route is more attractive to U.S. attorneys for various reasons, and most work 
by U.S. firms in Germany was and is U.S.-focused, concentrating on U.S. 
law either for U.S. businesses abroad or for foreign businesses with 
interests in the United States.
159
 
Presently, while both U.K. and U.S. law firms are highly regarded in 
Germany by clients and the legal community, U.K. firms have undoubtedly 




3.  The Current Legal Market: A Market Predominantly of Small Practices 
Notwithstanding the success of foreign firms, the number of German 
attorneys actually employed by any large law firm in Germany, whether 
German or foreign, is a small minority (less than 10%), and of that number, 
the number of attorneys working at the largest U.K. and U.S. law firms is 
yet another small fraction.
161
  This is true in spite of the fact that foreign law 
firms themselves are mostly staffed with German attorneys who earned 
their primary legal education in Germany.
162
  An overwhelming majority of 
German attorneys therefore work in the smaller settings of solo practices or 
in local partnerships.
163
  Through strategies such as formal or informal 
 
 156 The exam is, in practice, not as difficult as the regular German bar exam, and upon 
passing, an attorney is admitted to the German local bar association, becoming fully 
integrated as a German attorney without having to refer to his education abroad.  See Ronald 
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services in Germany.  The law governing the practice of nationals of EU member states is 
the Gesetz über die Tätigkeit europäischer Rechtsanwälte in Deutschland, or EuRAG.  For 
an English version of the law, see Law Implementing the Directives of the European 
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2000, Federal Law Gazette art. 1 (Ger.). 
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referral networks or alliances,
164
 firms in Frankfurt, for example, are led by 
lawyers educated in Germany, who offer advice on local law, and limit their 
business ties within borders.
165
  Domestic German law firms, whose 
employees are mostly German and whose advice is mostly on German law, 
have not merely survived, but thrive and adapt in re-emerging old firms, 
new independent firms, and new international startups.
166
 
Furthermore, entry into Germany has not been rosy for all foreign law 
firms.  A common scenario amidst the merger crazes involved internal 
splits within the German firm scheduled for merger.
167
  Senior associates 
and partners fled to form their own new boutiques
168
 based on the idea that 
attorneys wanted to work more closely with clients.
169
  It also took fifteen 
years for one of today’s leading U.S. law firms to make it to the top, 
landing the lead in Germany’s biggest M&A deal of the year in 2006 after 
being replaced as lead counsel for a prominent merger eight years prior.
170
  
The same year, the editor of the German legal magazine JUVE spotlighted 
the market for Mittelstand, or family-owned midsize industrial companies 
in Germany, which were internationally active and preferred smaller 
firms.
171
  A large workforce plus a foreign headquarters thus did not 
necessarily equate to automatic victory for a law firm in the German legal 
market. 
The continued success of German firms in Germany also lies in the 
fact that many foreign firms are much more concentrated in legal fields that 
have been deemed strategically important.
172
  Although U.K. firms in 
Germany maintain their full-service shops, U.S. firms continue to be more 
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Moreover, in light of the recent recession, full-service firms have been 
considering whether to retain all their services or to slough some fat and 
focus on certain practice areas.
174
  The need for a team of established 




While large law firms in Germany may be overshadowed by a few 
mega foreign law firms, even the largest law firms are primarily staffed 
with German attorneys.  Moreover, the vast majority of German attorneys 
maintain successful smaller practices, from solo practices to full-service 
firms.  In contrast, the large, foreign international firms have increasingly 
preferred practicing in only certain specialized areas of international private 
law, continuing to leave much legal practice to local attorneys.  The picture 
of the merger mania among large law firms is thus an extremely incomplete 
portrayal of the overall German legal market, which foreign firms have not 
and do not dominate. 
B.  Japan: Korea’s Precursor 
Shifting gears to a country that begs mention in an analysis of Korea’s 
legal market liberalization, this Comment turns to Japan’s legal market as a 
remarkable case study.  Japan and Korea share a long, albeit not always 
friendly, history, and many similar cultural values and concerns.
176
  The 
following analysis of Japan will seem in some, but not all, respects like a 
mirror image of that of Korea.  This is true, in part, because Korea has 
modeled the current opening of its market after Japan’s experiences with its 
legal market since the 1980s.
177
  Its forerunner by nearly a decade and a 
half, Japan’s past and current legal market is very relevant to making 
predictions about Korea’s current liberalization, not only by analyzing 
similarities between the two, but also by noting where the two diverge.  
This subpart first provides a summary of Japan’s historically closed legal 
services market, overviews its legal education reform, and ends with a look 
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at the current symbiotic relationship between domestic and foreign law 
firms. 
1.  Historical Protectionism Followed by Internal Merger Mania 
The roots of protectionism in Japan lay in a historical cultural stigma 
against the rule of law and lawyers in Japanese society.
178
  The Japanese 
government, Japanese industries, and Japanese attorneys kept the legal 
community in Japan small, and liked it that way.
179
  Japanese businesses 
feared the emergence of American-style litigation, legal expenses, and large 
damage awards; the Japanese legal community sought to restrict 
competition by limiting the number of attorneys in its domestic monopoly 
and keeping foreign attorneys out.
180
 
However, from the 1980s to the 1990s, Japan, like many East Asian 
countries, underwent massive liberalization of its economy,
181
 and an 
opening to its legal services market followed suit.  In liberalizing its legal 
market, Japan took a number of baby steps over the course of about two 
decades.  Over lingering concerns of professional autonomy and the proper 
social role of attorneys,
182
 Japan first formally allowed foreign attorneys to 
practice in Japan in 1986, under the Special Measures Law Concerning 
Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Attorneys, commonly known as 
Law 66.
183
  Law 66, however, still prohibited foreign lawyers and firms 
from employing or forming partnerships with Japanese attorneys, or using 
official firm names.
184
  In short, the law allowed foreign attorneys in Japan 
to “practice” the law of their home jurisdiction.
185
 
An amendment to Law 66 in 1994 subsequently allowed law firms to 
ally with Japanese firms in “specific joint enterprises” that could employ 
both foreign and Japanese attorneys.
186
  Previously, foreign firms had been 
forced to engage in business under the name of an individual senior partner 
who registered under the law, but after the 1994 amendment, were also 
allowed to use their official firm names.
187
  Foreign firms were still 
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prohibited, however, from hiring Japanese attorneys directly or 
independently of a partnership with a Japanese law firm.
188
  An amendment 
just two years later in 1996 further allowed foreign attorneys to represent 
clients in international arbitrations in Japan.
189
 
One impetus behind these increased openings in Japan involved 
financial deregulation and an increase in foreign direct investment over the 
1990s.
190
  The increase of complex corporate matters slowly heightened 
recognition of the importance of legal services in addressing new business 
risks and opportunities, leading business leaders to demand greater and 
better business attorneys.
191
  Increasing demand for corporate legal services, 
rising popularity of large corporate law firms, growing recognition of the 
importance of both law and lawyers, and increasing competition among 
firms to recruit highly qualified attorneys led Japanese law firms to grow 
and merge with each other.
192
  Before most foreign firms even entered the 
fray in the early 2000s, mid-size Japanese firms were first losing good 
associates to elite Japanese firms.
193
  They then lost associates to the foreign 
joint enterprise firms that had been slowly growing since the passing of the 
1994 amendment to Law 66.
194
  The end of this period of mergers resulted 
in the elite “Big Four”
195
 large corporate Japanese law firms.
196
  Unlike the 
local firms in Germany that rapidly and almost contemporaneously bulked 
up with both each other and foreign law firms entering the open market in 
mass numbers,
197




The reasons given for the mergers were common ones, and included 
the need to meet client demands for greater expertise and the ability to 
provide sufficient resources to handle large complex matters.
199
  There was 
little direct evidence, however, that clients ever truly made such demands, 
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but there is at least anecdotal evidence that attorneys feared losing client 
business if they fell behind other local or joint enterprise firms.
200
  
Consequently, one scholar has suggested a more robust explanation behind 




By 2003, Japanese parliament had passed a law that allowed for full 
integration between foreign and Japanese law firms beginning in 2005.
202
  
As a result, some took full advantage of the liberalization, and instituted 
immediate mergers, most notably, the Japanese firm Mitsui, Yasuda, Wani 
& Maeda, and the U.K.-originating firm Linklaters LLP.
203
  Others were 
happy with maintaining their joint enterprises
204
 or just changing their 
names.
205
  However, because the growing domestic legal services market 
had relatively few players by then, the elite Japanese firms that led it were 
happy to maintain their status and were reluctant to engage in international 
mergers with foreign firms.
206
  A survey done around the passing of this 
final 2003 legislation also showed that Japanese companies still desired 
Japanese lawyers.
207
  Overall, there seemed to be consensus that Japanese 
attorneys had skills that their foreign counterparts lacked, and that access to 
native attorneys was important.
208
 
2.  Legal Education Reform 
In the spirit of increasing liberalization, Japan also implemented 
comprehensive legal education reform intended to produce more attorneys 
and help increase the rule of law in Japanese society.
209
  Prior to 2004, the 
Japanese system of legal education mirrored the German system from 
which it was deliberately adapted.
210
  Students in Japan began their legal 
studies after high school in a university before taking two examinations.
211
  
Practical training occurred between the two examinations, overseen by 
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Japan’s national Legal Training and Research Institute.
212
  Unlike German 
qualifying exams, however, the Institute’s first exam was so difficult that 
the average successful applicant took it five times, which severely limited 
the number of candidates admitted to practical training.
213
 
In April 2004, Japan saw the opening of over sixty new law schools,
214
 
which now resemble the education system of the United States and 
implement a three-year graduate course.
215
  The wholesale appearance of 
the law schools at one time was unprecedented, largely undertaken in the 
face of pressure to produce more and better qualified attorneys.
216
  At least 
one scholar, however, was unimpressed by Japan’s recent changes in the 
legal profession, and saw such reform as insufficient to change the direction 
of the study of law from being the historical preparation for a bar 
examination to a socially beneficial and practical profession.
217
  Another 
scholar agrees that “the attempt to incorporate [the U.S.-style] Socratic 
system into Japan’s heavily-embedded Confucian teaching structure has 
still not met all expectations.  Namely, . . . students are narrow in breadth 
and depth in various fields, and the overall quality of legal professionals 
may not have significantly improved.”
218
  It has been admittedly difficult to 
evaluate whether Japan’s comprehensive legal reform has led to real 
change, and whether the new law schools have actually made Japan’s legal 
market more competitive.
219
  Nevertheless, others acknowledge the 
obstacles in breaking through tradition and old educational habits, and still 
argue that Japan may realize significant benefits with continued patience 
and perseverance.
220
  While the effects of the new school system may not be 
concretely ascertained yet, the underlying ambition of the schools suggests 
movement in the right direction of cultivating competition in the 
international legal market,
221
 and has, at the very least, influenced the legal 
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3.  The Current Legal Market: A Symbiotic Relationship 
Legal practice in Japan has become increasingly specialized.
223
  Over 
the past decade, the bulk of work for large Japanese law firms has reverted 
from cross-border to domestic matters.
224
  This surge in domestic work has 
come from financial products, compliance and corporate governance, and 
domestic litigation.
225
  Over the gradual opening of the market in 1986, 
1994, and 2003, foreign law firms simultaneously became increasingly 
successful at competing with domestic firms.
226
  Thus, Japanese law firms’ 
renewed focus on domestic law has also been spurred by foreign law firms’ 
greater share of work on cross-border legal transactions.
227
 
As for predictions on future integrations or partnerships between 
foreign law firms and Japanese law firms, the perspectives vary.  Some 
foreign firms with a Japan office have decided to stick to a particular 
practice focus and remain independent, expressing no interest in recruiting 
Japanese attorneys.
228
  Other firms with the same perspective indicate that 
foreign clients wishing to do business in Japan are still best served by a 
leading Japanese firm.
229
  A second perspective finds full integration 
indistinguishable from the former joint enterprises first allowed in 1994.
230
  
Joint enterprises have also allowed the carving of special relationships, 
including partnerships between foreign firms and multiple Japanese 
firms.
231
  Finally, as Linklaters did, others with a third perspective view the 
single partnership between foreign and Japanese legal professionals as the 
superior alternative to allow seamless advice to clients.
232
  Evidence and 
sentiments suggest that the first two perspectives are preferred. 
Currently, foreign involvement in Japan’s legal market is 
overshadowed by one firm, Morrison & Foerster LLP (MoFo), which has 
the largest practice of any international law firm in Japan.
233
  With over 120 
attorneys,
234
 MoFo’s Tokyo office has grown forty-fold over the last two 
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  MoFo arrived early on the scene, immediately after Law 66 
first allowed for foreign participation in the legal market in 1986.
236
  The 
firm became large after bolding the collapse of the bubble economy in 
1991, continuing to send lawyers and draw clients.
237
  MoFo has held the 
crown as the largest foreign office in Japan since as early as 2003,
238
 even 
before the final legislation allowing for full integration between foreign and 
Japanese law firms went into effect.
239
  By signaling to the Japanese 
community that they came to Japan for the long haul, managing MoFo 
partners indicated that they did not worry about competition.
240
  Other 
foreign firms continue to struggle to win the loyalty of Japanese companies 
that have established connections to firms like MoFo, and experimenting 
international law firms will need greater ties to Japan to succeed, by 
securing relationships with Japanese clients or having experienced Japanese 
hands lead their practice.
241
  The firm rooting of MoFo has carried the day, 
and MoFo’s continuation of its joint enterprise with Ito & Mitomi for over a 
decade
242
 suggests that the 1994 amendment was and remains the most 
influential step in Japan’s completed liberalization. 
V.  A LOOK FORWARD: THE FUTURE OF KOREA’S LEGAL 
MARKET 
A.  The Continued Success of Korean Law Firms 
The preservation of local law firms in Korea will likely resemble the 
developments seen in recent years in Japan, and not the history of firms in 
Germany.  When Korea and Japan received international pressure to open 
their legal markets, Japan chose to succumb over the 1980s and 1990s while 
Korea chose to do nothing.
243
  Korea has consequently been able to not only 
observe the developments of the Japanese legal market as it opened to the 
world, but since Korea has modeled its own gradual market liberalization 
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after Japan’s, can also safely expect to see similar developments in the near 
future.  This is true in spite of the fact that Korea’s liberalization plans are 
expected to roll out over the course of five years, while the same course in 
Japan took nearly two decades, because Japan, taking a more cautious 
approach, had no predecessor to look to for guidance.  Japanese attorneys 
have remained independent and continue to succeed, years through and 
after their market’s liberalization,
244
 and their Korean counterparts will be 
able to do the same—probably even better. 
Specifically, the Korean legal market will largely remain unchanged 
for five reasons—lessons drawn from Germany and Japan: (1) Korean law 
firms have heavy man- and brain- power in providing full-service legal 
counsel; (2) any foreign legal office or legal consultant expanding to Korea 
will likely practice in a specialized niche of services, leaving local firms to 
continue dominating domestic matters; (3) social appreciation for branding 
will keep the elite Korean firms well respected and, for the same reason, 
those few international firms with a history of handling Korean matters will 
continue to outshine the market of foreign participation; (4) the number of 
Korean corporations in need of foreign legal advice constitutes a very small 
demand pool for foreign firms and attorneys; and (5) operating in Korea by 
employing Korean-American attorneys will be a few steps more 
complicated for U.K. firms than U.S. firms, leaving the market in U.S. 
hands. 
1.  Lesson #1: Korea Has a Sophisticated Legal Market and Is 
Implementing Recent Legal Education Reform 
Unlike Germany in the early 1990s, and more like Japan following its 
internal mergers, Korea is opening up a legal services market that is already 
developed,
245
 and whose large law firms already number in the triple digits 
of attorneys.  The legal profession has grown rapidly in Korea,
246
 and the 
rule of law has been widely accepted.
247
  Decades after the first spurt of 
global expansion, firms largely remain conservative in their reach, and the 
Korean legal community should make outmoded the popular concern of 
being swallowed up in a similar merger mania as German firms saw in an 
entirely different era. 
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In particular, Korean attorneys handling corporate cases are highly 
qualified, having gained considerable transactional experience through 
corporate M&A matters during the Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s.
248
  A decade later, Korea was still experiencing soaring M&A 
activity.
249
  Korean attorneys have also been recently recognized around the 
world for their excellence in competition and trade matters, intellectual 
property, and dispute resolution, in addition to their strength in corporate 
matters.
250
  Korea’s largest law firm, Kim & Chang, boasts prominent 
former judges and prosecutors, including former Korean Supreme Court 
Justices, a Minister of Justice, and a Prosecutor General.
251
  In a late 2011 
survey of the largest recent transactions involving targets or acquirers from 
Asian regions, Korea was the only country whose largest transaction, at 
$1.75 billion, involved entirely domestic counsel.
252
  In contrast, Japan’s 
three largest transactions in late 2011 were counseled entirely by foreign 
firms; no Japanese firms took the lead in providing legal advice for such 
deals aggregately valued at over $18 billion.
253
 
Still, Korea, like Japan,
254
 has recently implemented a new law school 
system also modeled after U.S. graduate law schools with the aim of 
producing qualified lawyers on a large scale.
255
  The reforms have been 
targeted at addressing the same criticism Japan faced, namely that the 
current legal education system
256
 guided students in exam-taking methods 
rather than towards a legal and professional study to develop creative 
problem solving skills.
257
  The twenty-five new U.S.-style postgraduate 
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M&A (2012) (ranking the legal advisors for M&A activity in Korea for the first half of 
2012). 
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 254 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
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Korean law schools were launched in 2009, and the first class graduated in 
February 2012.
258
  By 2017, Korea’s new law schools are supposed to 
completely supplant the JTRI, that infamous institute that has denied 
admission to thousands of trainees who have failed one of the world’s most 
rigorous bar exams, although both systems of legal education operate side 
by side for now.
259
  Upon graduation from the new law schools, students are 
also taking a new, separate bar exam.
260
  Currently, while the total number 
of law school students is limited to 2,000 per year, that number is double 
the amount of attorneys who have been passing the original bar exam.
261
 
Naturally, apart from the potential influx of foreign attorneys in the 
Korean legal community, there is also some discomfort regarding the 
internal competition between recent law graduates of the former JTRI and 
the inaugural class of the new system.
262
  Since at least 2010,
263
 newly 
graduated Korean attorneys under the earlier system have faced a tough 
local market, but the prospect of an open Korean legal services market has 
actually created more domestic jobs,
264
 and will likely continue, as firms 
 
intellectual property, which is lacking in the supply of Korean attorneys of the former 
system, and emphasizing the need for professional training and practice).  For a more 
skeptical analysis of the proposed benefits of the new law school system, see Nathan D. 
McMurray, New Korean Law School and Bar Exam System. Fewer Dragons from Little 
Streams?, KOR. L. TODAY (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.korealawtoday.com/2011/12/26/new-
korean-law-school-and-bar-exam-system-fewer-dragons-from-streams/, in which an adjunct 
professor at the JTRI suggests that the change will make the legal profession a club for the 
wealthy and connected. 
 258 Soon-to-be Lawyers, KOR. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012 6:04 PM), 
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new Korean law school system). 
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44.4% of the JTRI’s trainees were yet to be hired by any company in Korea as of graduation 
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by the six major Korean law firms was expected to be a forty percent increase from the 
previous year.  Law Firms Strive for Survival, Lawyers Welcome Open Legal Market, DONG-
A ILBO (Jan. 8, 2008, 8:16 AM), 
http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=040000&biid=2008010816858. 
  
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:237 (2012) 
268 
bulk up brains in preparation for competition against foreign firms.
265
  
Regardless of whether the influx of a new breed of attorneys is homegrown 
from a new legal education system or imported from abroad, a greater 
number of attorneys is a healthy ingredient to engendering competition, 
which is necessary to any successful services industry.
266
 
While Korea may have yet to see what impact the adoption of its new 
legal education system will have on the competitiveness of its legal market, 
the complete transition to a system replacing the only process to practicing 
law that Korea has ever known will undoubtedly lead to interesting 
developments in decades to come.  Hopefully, the more liberal education 
and a focus away from memorization skills to pass one difficult bar exam 
will allow Korean attorneys to better relate to and service their clients by 
acquiring the skills to handle complex issues and to adapt to a changing 
world earlier in their careers.
267
  Allowing students to pursue diverse 
backgrounds in their undergraduate studies is expected to create a breed of 
interdisciplinary future attorneys.
268
  On the other hand, evidence from 
Japan has not been able to positively support this.
269
  Japanese firms may 
still not be concretely reaping the benefits of legal education overhaul 
modeled after U.S. law schools,
270
 but its dissatisfaction with its prior 
duplication of a German-style legal education system
271
 serves as a 
reminder that similar methods in different countries often cause varied 
results, and Korea may see success. 
The silver lining of the previous education system’s rigorous standards 
is that they encouraged many Korean students failing the difficult bar exam 
to resort to studies in the United States.
272
  Since the early 2000s, there has 
been a substantial rise in the number of foreign law graduates in U.S. law 
schools.
273
  In jurisdictions all over the world, foreign and local firms alike 
have increasingly been relying on U.S.-educated and experienced local 
practitioners.
274
  The role of LL.M. graduates from the United States, who 
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earned their primary legal education in another country, is growing.
275
  
These LL.M. graduates may seem to be the perfect choice for U.S. firms at 
their branch offices abroad, but research indicates that the local firms are 
the firms in those countries that have a substantial presence of such 
graduates.
276
  In fact, in 2006, before the KORUS FTA was signed, at least 
20% of the lawyers at top Korean law firms were Korean nationals with 
foreign legal educations serving as informal legal consultants.
277
  Korea also 
has a particularly strong tie to U.S. schools: in 2011, Korea sent about 
seventeen times more students to pursue U.S. educations than India, twelve 
times more than China, and about nine times more than Japan.
278
 
Offering local expertise to international firms and a general familiarity 
with U.S. law, these dual-educated attorneys enable their Korean law firm-
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sends the most students to the United States annually in absolute numbers than any other 
country.  The student figures are based on research from the Institute of International 
Education while the figures on population size are based on reports from the U.S. 
Department of State.  See INST. INT’L EDUC., OPEN DOORS FACT SHEET: CHINA (2011), 
available at http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-
by-Country/~/media/Files/Corporate/Open-Doors/Fact-Sheets-
2011/Country/China%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Open%20Doors%202011.ashx; INST. INT’L 
EDUC., OPEN DOORS FACT SHEET: INDIA (2011), available at http://www.iie.org/Research-
and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-Country/~/media/Files/Corporate/Open-
Doors/Fact-Sheets-2011/Country/India%20Fact%20Sheet%20-
%20Open%20Doors%202011.ashx; INST. INT’L EDUC., OPEN DOORS FACT SHEET: JAPAN 
(2011), available at http://www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-
Sheets-by-Country/~/media/Files/Corporate/Open-Doors/Fact-Sheets-
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employers to offer services without a U.S. law firm, translator, manager, or 
other intermediary.
279
  The large number of Korean LL.M. students, 
considered domestic legal consultants by trade, offers a competitive edge to 
local Korean law firms. 
2.  Lesson #2: The Legal Profession Will Become Increasingly Specialized 
in Korea 
A few Korean firms, with their ears out for eventual foreign arrival, 
did grow through conservative mergers and lateral hires.
280
  However, while 
the president of the local bar association suggested that Korean law firms 
needed to expand through mergers and the recruitment of laterals to sharpen 
their competiveness with the anticipated influx of foreign law firms and 
attorneys,
281
 it is unlikely and infeasible that the already small handful of 
large Korean law firms need to further unite to fend their territory through 
numbers.  The largest law firm in Korea staffs over 800 professionals,
282
 
and no foreign law firm aims to establish an equivalent presence in Korea in 
absolute numbers
283
 in the way Eurocentric U.K. firms aggressed in 
Germany.
284
  Although Korea’s geographic position is attractive for 
business in Northern Asia, it is not currently nor imminently expected to be 
an Asian financial center like Germany was in the 1990s, when firms 
flocked to the area to maintain a competitive edge in a changing global 
financial market.  There is simply no business reason for U.K. or U.S. firms 
to employ up to 25% of their global workforce
285
 in Korea or even to staff 
the same on Korea-related matters whether originating from Korea or 
elsewhere.  If anything, when permitted, Korea may see the emergence of 
ventures between slightly lower-tiered Korean law firms and smaller 
foreign law firms who may see such partnerships as ways to bolster their 
own less recognized practices, perhaps the way U.S. firms viewed their late 
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presence in Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
286
 
In addition, those Korean firms that have merged did so with the goal 
of bolstering their practice areas where foreign firms are unlikely to 
compete, such as regulatory practices and domestic litigation.
287
  The goal 
of Korean firms in expansion is also not focused on growth exclusively 
within Korea, but rather on establishing an international presence and 
boosting their own overseas involvement in neighboring Asian countries.
288
 
A focus back to exclusively practicing domestic law may or may not 
be forthcoming in Korea, as has been the case in Japan, but niches will 
likely still be created in the Korean legal market, driven mostly by the 
incentives of the foreign firms.  In some areas of the law, foreign firms with 
an international practice in fields such as cross-border M&A transactions 
and structured finance will likely dominate and should not be excluded 
from those markets.  Some Korean firms may acquire a similar international 
presence and profile, enabling them to effectively compete with those 
foreign firms, whereas others may choose to focus on purely domestic 
matters of law, which usually do not attract competition from foreign firms 
anyway.  The same is true for U.S. firms that may advise Korean clients on 
U.S. litigation, including intellectual property disputes, or U.S. government 
regulatory issues—areas of the law that are contrastingly outside of the 
scope of Korean legal practice. 
Rather than compete for business, foreign attorneys and firms will find 
it more profitable to operate in different spheres than their Korean 
counterparts as they seek to facilitate business in the region, rather than 
practice Korean law.
289
  That foreign firms have been focusing on certain 
specialty areas that play to the firms’ strengths and existing clients’ needs is 
not so different from the ways in which industries engaged in the sale of 
goods have internationalized.
290
  Manufacturing and sale activities, taken 
overseas, must adapt to the local markets, whether in Germany, Japan, or 
Korea, and “selling internationally,” whether goods or services, means 
redefining professional competence.
291
  For foreign firms and attorneys in 
Korea, this means targeting major outbound deal work and limiting 
practices to advising on non-Korean law. 
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3.  Lesson #3: The Heightened Value of Branding in Korea Will Keep Both 
Elite Korean Law Firms and Long-Established Foreign Korea Practices at 
the Top 
Depending on the varying perspectives in Korea, Korean law firms 
have the option to form fully integrated partnerships within five years of the 
implementation of the KORUS FTA or to maintain any joint ventures that 
may have been created within that time, or may simply continue 
independent practices.  Because the competitive strength of Korean firms 
relies in part on their uniquely elite status in Korean society, the most 
successful Korean firms will likely opt to continue their well-regarded 
independent practices.
292
  In the international market, trust comes with the 
brand of the firm,
293
 and this will prove to be even truer in a society like 
Korea, where consumers are known to be very brand-conscious.
294
  Korean 
firms as well as their gratified Korean clients will take pride in maintaining 
the status of the elite Korean law firm and its esteemed reputation, making 




In the same vein, the international firms that have built Korea-focused 
practices from Hong Kong or Tokyo are few,
296
 and their presence as the 
go-to foreign firms on Korean matters is likely to remain strong, whether 
they or others open offices in Korea.  The U.S. firm, Cleary Gottlieb Steen 
& Hamilton LLP (Cleary), holds the title as Korea’s leading foreign 
international practice.
297
  Its current lead has resulted from its delivery of 
sophisticated services that please its Korean clients, but its initial entry into 
the local market was more a result of timing and fortune.
298
 
Cleary’s Korea practice head, Jinduk Han, turned out to be the only 
Korean-speaking U.S. securities lawyer available to help out Korean 
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corporations in the late 1990s when they were just beginning to open 
themselves to foreign capital.
299
  Han personally approached major Korean 
companies to explain the processes of U.S. debt offerings, after Rule 144A 
of the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission cleared the way for U.S. 
institutional investors to participate in foreign issues.
300
  The Korean 
government later turned to Cleary for help with the country’s collapsing 
banking system during the Asian financial crisis.
301
  Han referred to what 
then ensued as a snowballing effect for the firm, where “[o]ne deal led to 
another, and the same issuers started doing repeat deals.”
302
  Confident that 
Cleary will retain its lead in Korea even with the KORUS FTA, Cleary’s 
attorneys point to their depth and expertise, the difficulty other firms would 
face to catch up with Cleary’s longstanding track record in Korea, and the 
fact that others have already shown up and left.
303
 
The example of MoFo in Japan may be Cleary’s forerunner in Korea.  
In fact, Cleary closed a failing office in Tokyo in 2006, bringing eighteen 
years of practice to an end.
304
  The fate of these two firms in Korea and 
Japan demonstrates the value of relational ties and history in these legal 
services markets, and suggests that the few foreign firms with established 
names in Korea will remain strong, while newly venturing international 
firms will vie for clients who are already largely satisfied with what they 
have.  In fact, these firms with strong Korea ties find the move into Seoul 
more a formality of perceived reputational competition and expectation than 
a necessity to continue business as usual.
305
  The importance of branding to 
Korean clientele will play a role in the success of foreign firms, and the 
handful of U.S. firms with an established presence in Korea can thus sit 
back and relax for the time being. 
4.  Lesson #4: Korean Clients with International Legal Concerns Are Too 
Few to Demand a Large Foreign Supply Pool 
The impact of branding to Korean clients on narrowing the list of 
viable foreign law firm openings in Korea will further be compounded by 
the nature of Korean commercial infrastructure—Korea has only a very 
small band of very big companies.  Not only will the handful of prestigious 
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Korean and established foreign firms continue to overshadow the Korean 
legal services market, but the sole consumers of that market, the large 




The presence of powerful domestic conglomerates in Korea is a result 
of the history of chaebols, or exclusive family-run business groups.
307
  
Birthed in the 1960s, Korean chaebols played a major role in getting the 
Korea’s economy to where it is today and they continue to have great 
influence.
308
  Philippe Shin, a senior FLC at the major Korean firm of Shin 
& Kim, acknowledges the chaebols as a “fixture of Korean life at all levels 
of society.”
309
  Indeed, the most familiar Korean names around the world 
are these chaebols, including Samsung, Hyundai, and LG.
310
  The growth of 
chaebols was correspondingly accompanied by the historical 
underdevelopment of small and medium enterprises (SMEs),
311
 and even 
today, Korean companies “tail off dramatically in size after the big names 
are counted.”
312
  The largest of companies with a significant amount of 
overseas work that trigger international legal concerns currently constitute 
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In contrast, SMEs have flourished in Japan as major employers and 
exporters,
314
 leading to the existence of a vast second tier of large Japanese 
companies, including many technology companies in need of advice on 
intellectual property disputes in different jurisdictions abroad.
315
  
Consequently, while litigation may generally be an area of growth for 
foreign firms practicing in Asia, the prospect in Korea involves “a limited 
company list and a large pool of lawyers trying to service it”
316
 that will be 
much more challenging to break through
317
 than might be the case for firms 
looking to markets with more diversified corporations, as in Germany, or 
with vibrant SMEs, such as Japan.  This challenge will again be made more 




5.  Lesson #5: U.K. Firms Facing Hurdles Will Be Further Reluctant to 
Enter Korea 
Finally, while the buzz surrounding the earlier KOREU FTA 
suggested that U.K. firms might have an early mover advantage over U.S. 
firms who awaited Congress’ ratification of the KORUS FTA, no U.K. firm 
had made any announcements of opening a Korea office by the end of 
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first signing, eighty percent of respondents stated they wanted to hire foreign counsel based 
on dissatisfaction with the services provided by Korean firms.  Lin, supra note 277, at 127–
28.  In a later survey of fifty major Korean corporations, state-run companies, and financial 
institutions, only about seventy percent said they would hire foreign attorneys, at least for 
“certain matters.”  Don Southerton, Korean Companies Desire Foreign Law Firms Services, 
KOREALEGAL.ORG (June 30, 2010, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.koreaexpertwitness.com/blog/news/korean-companies-desire-foreign-law-firms-
services/ (citing the Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo).  Five companies, however, said that 
they would not turn to foreign law firms at all after the market’s opening.  Id. 
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  Halfway through 2012, only one U.K. firm had successfully 
applied to open a Seoul office while the roster of U.S. firms engaged in the 
approval process grew to over ten.
320
  In the background, Korea has always 
had stronger personal ties with the United States,
321
 based on immigration 
and students studying abroad,
322
 giving U.S. firms easier access to the large 
population of Korean-Americans and Korean nationals studying at top U.S. 
law schools to head their Korea practices.
323
  Furthermore, practical 
implications of the FLCA’s language are also keeping U.K. firms a few 
more steps away than U.S. firms from setting up shops in Korea. 
On a more technical level, the FLCA—the Korean statute that 
specifies the qualifications for entry into the legal services market—
provides that FLCs in Korea must have at least three years of experience 
practicing
324
 and be limited to providing advice on the laws of the country 
in which they are licensed.
325
  Although the same registered FLCs may also 
provide legal advice on generally approved international customary law as 
well as international arbitration proceedings,
326
 many U.K.-employed, U.S.-
trained attorneys will not be eligible to register as FLCs in Korea. 
Many lawyers in U.K. firms’ Korea practices, either Korean-American 
or Korean nationals with U.S. legal educations, are U.S.-qualified,
327
 and 
will automatically fail to meet one of the FLCA’s prerequisites for 
practicing in Korea if they have never practiced in the United States or are 
not officially U.K.-qualified.
328
  There are very few Korean-speaking 
attorneys with U.K. qualifications at U.K. firms, and even less with three 
years of experience officially practicing in the U.K. that would give them 
eligibility to be an FLC, let alone to advise on U.K. law.
329
  U.K. firms with 
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 322 See supra notes 272–78 and accompanying text. 
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Law Firms?, THE AMLAW DAILY (Mar. 24, 2009, 11:27 AM), 
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an eye on opening offices in Korea must hope to have in their employ 
Korean-speaking attorneys already admitted as U.K. solicitors, or ask them 
to go through the processes of first becoming U.K.-qualified and then 




U.S. law, however, and not U.K. law, has long been favored for cross-
border deals in Korea,
331
 and as such, there may not even be much of a 
market for counsel from U.K.-qualified, trained, and experienced attorneys 
in Korea.  Consequently, such U.K. firms’ U.S.-trained attorneys would 
have to switch to advising on U.S. law, in which they also may not have the 
requisite three years of experience.  While a technical hurdle, these few 
extra steps will keep U.K. firms lacking attorneys with automatic FLC 
eligibility from making the move into Seoul, leaving the market to the U.S. 
firms that lead it anyway.  U.K. firms are currently experiencing a Korea 
that is much like the Germany U.S. firms faced in the 1990s—one that is 
less attractive and less accessible. 
B.  Evidence in Action So Far 
Legal media and international firm attorneys have been making 
forecasts about firms’ moves for years.  On the eve of Korea’s ratification 
of the KORUS FTA, many leading Korea practice attorneys of foreign 
firms were expressing reservations about relocating to Seoul, citing 
children’s commitments to international schools, preference for warmer 
weather, lower taxes, and the more expat-friendly environment of Hong 
Kong.
332
  Cleary’s own head Korea practice attorney, Han, was 
noncommittal about a move in the fall of 2011, stating that a launch in 
Korea would be less about filling any gaps in their practices, and more 
about addressing perceptions.
333
  Another Korea practice head expressed the 
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same sentiments, saying that a physical presence in Korea would add little 
value to those firms with preexisting strong relationships with key Korean 
clients.
334
  At the same time, this attorney also believed that if some made 
the move, others would be bound to follow as a defensive measure,
335
 
reminiscent of the pioneering U.K. firms in Germany
336




However, those firms that would be at all susceptible to such a herd 
mentality are limited to the few international firms that already have a 
prominently established Korea practice.  Unlike the frenzy of match-making 
that mega foreign and local firms faced in Germany, or the perceived 
reputational competition that may have prompted internal mergers in Japan, 
the foreigners with a viable Korea practice have already made their lead in 
that practice known to the legal community around the world.  
Consequently, Korea will still not likely see an invasion by every large 
international law firm with some business in East Asia, simply because a 
few start to make the move.  In fact, 113 of the Am Law 200 firms
338
 have 
just one foreign office or none at all, but almost all are nonetheless finding 
their work to be increasingly global from within U.S. borders.
339
  Simply 
put, many firms are comfortable where they are, and are not looking 
forward to facing a new learning curve by physically relocating to Korea, 
an environment that will present different regulations and new cultural and 
social nuances,
340
 which they can continue to avoid in their current offices. 
As of January 2013, a number of firms had officially opened, applied 
to open, or expressed interest in or plans to open a Korea office.  These 
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Covington & Burling LLP,
352
 O’Melveny & Myers LLP,
353
 K&L Gates 
LLP,
354
 McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP,
355
 and of course, Cleary.
356
  At 
least two U.S. firms of less than fifty attorneys have also applied to open 
offices in Korea.
357
  Others, such as U.K.-based Freshfields and Allen & 
Overy LLP, have indicated that they currently have no plans to open an 
office in Seoul, expecting to continue their Korea practices out of Hong 
Kong.
358
  The scorecard so far seems to suggest, therefore, that firms are 
making the expected moves, with the few U.S. firms having extensive 
Korea practices taking the lead, U.K. firms largely staying put, and Korean 
firms standing tall. 
C.  Other General Benefits of the Liberalization 
Ending this analysis on the positive expectations of liberalization, this 
subpart summarizes its commonly cited benefits, which include better 
quality and accountability of legal services.  For example, one immediate 
practical effect from the FLCA and FTAs will be a working registration 
system to recognize foreign attorneys as either individual proprietors or a 
member of an FLC office.
359
  It is no secret that a large number of foreign 
attorneys have already been working in Korea for over three decades as 
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legal consultants to Korean clients.
360
  They have essentially practiced law 
in Korea and required only the final approval signature on documents by a 
Korean attorney.
361
  With the open and official acceptance of these foreign 
attorneys, the granting of licenses and registration through the Korean Bar 
Association and approval of the Ministry of Justice
362
 will help Korea 
maintain professional and ethical standards.
363
 
In addition, the FLCA’s requirement that FLCs reside in Korea for at 
least 180 days per year
364
 may lead to quicker and better cultural 
understanding as well as the building of relationships.  Similarly, limiting 
entry to attorneys with at least three years of work experience
365
 and to 
firms that have had at least five years of normal operation
366
 in their home 
countries ensures that both businesses and attorneys have an adequate level 
of expertise.  Finally, requiring that the main office of foreign firms 
guarantee civil or commercial liabilities relating to the office’s business
367
 
deters potential legal misconduct or malpractice.  Over the next years, the 
legal community hopes to see benefits to domestic consumers for legal 




VI.  CONCLUSION 
From a bird’s-eye view, the Korean legal services market will 
probably not fundamentally change in the near future.  A close-up view of 
only the top law firms in Korea may, however, demonstrate an expansion in 
the role and range of work activities of elite Korean attorneys.  
Comparisons in Korea to developments of foreign law firms in Germany 
are both faulty and obsolete, while the more relevant example of Japanese 
trends has been so far difficult to measure and evaluate.  However, all 
interested parties—local law firms, international law firms, governments, 
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attorneys, and businesses both large and small—should continue to strive to 
find those collaborations that best serve progress and growth in the context 
of the time and specific places in which they exist. 
 
